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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 






REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 14688 
ARGUMENT, 
POINT I 
THE ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
ON ITS FACE 
Salt Lake City contends that its ordinance was 
patterned verbatim from Oregon and Hawaii laws tacitly 
approved by.the United States Supreme Court. (Respondent's 
Brief, Pg. 6) To support this claim, in Exhibit "A" to its 
brief, S:alt Lake juxtaposes Oregon and Hawaii definitions with 
Salt Lake's definitions. Salt Lake is correct. They are 
virtually verbatim. . 
But there the similarities end. The charging 
sections of the respective laws are so unalike that the 
difference shines like a dead mackeral in the moonlight. The 
Oregon general obscenity law, Oregon Revised Statutes §167.087, 
prohibits exhibiting "obscene" material. See Oregon Revised 
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Statutes §167.087 attached hereto as Appendix "A". However/ 
the corresponding Salt Lake general obscenity law does not 
prohibit exhibiting obscenity but prohibits exhibiting anything 
which contains "obscene sexual conduct", an "obscene per-
formance", "obscenities", etc. See §32-2-10. "Obscene 
performance" is defined as one containing "nudity". See 
§32-2-10.1 (8) and "nudity" means bare breasts. See §32-2-10.1 
(7). Thus a film of the Ballet Africans or of National 
Educational Television's Life Story of Isadora Duncan could 
be proscribed because of bare breasts. The artistic triumphs 
of Sir Peter Paul Rubens and Amadeo Modigliani would pre-
sumptively be barred by the ordinance because of their 
appreciation of the curve of the naked female form. Time, 
Newsweek, Vogue and National Geographic all have bare breasts 
and thus become presumptively criminal materials. Many of 
the recent winners of the Pulitzer Prize and National Book 
Award would be prosecutable by an overzealous Salt Lake 
prosecutor on the grounds they contain obscenities. 
If a film can be proscribed merely because it has 
in it obscene sexual conduct, or an obscene performance, or 
nudity or obscenities, the state can condemn it merely because 
one part is objectionable. This ignores the Supreme Court's 
holding that the First Amendment requires that material be 
treated as a whole, Miller v. Calif,, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973); 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-490 (1957)-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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While Oregon's statute is like Salt Lake's in 
defining such terms as "obscenities", "obscene sexual conduct", 
"nudity", etc., there is one monumental difference. Oregon 
only proscribes such things for children. See Oregon Revised 
Statutes §167.065, 167.075, 167.080 in Appendix "A" attached 
hereto. Salt Lake's draftsmen, however, prohibit such things 
for adults and thus restrict adults to what may be suitable for 
children. Such is to "burn the house to roast the pig". 
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). , 
Admittedly Salt Lake's definition of "obscene" 
is correct but where in its general obscenity law does Salt 
Lake prohibit exhibition of "obscene" material? Nowhere. 
POINT II 
THE ORDINANCE CANNOT BE SAVED BY 
CONSTRUCTION OR SEVERANCE 
Salt Lake relies heavily on the fact that several 
trial judges have held part of the ordinance relating to 
"obscene sexual conduct" constitutional and have severed the 
rest. (Respondent's Brief, Pg. 12). What those trial judges 
ignore is that §32-2-10 (3) proscribes material that merely 
depicts "obscene sexual conduct". Thus if something merely 
contains obscene sexual conduct it is criminal. This would 
reach material that has one offensive scene. See the 
description (pg. 9 of Appellant's Supplemental Brief) of 
the German film "The Lost Honor of Katrina Blum", which has one 
< 
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Ti 
split-second depiction of "obscene sexual conduct" yet would 
fall within the ordinance. Such construction allows Salt Lake 
to ignore the admonition in Miller and Roth that the material 
must be judged as a whole. 413 U.S. at 24; 354 U.S. at 489-490. 
To save this ordinance by construction, this court 
must delete the following words from Salt Lake City Ordinance 
§32-2-10 (3) : 
" . . . depicts or represents or 
describes obscene sexual conduct, 
an obscene performance, obscenities 
or obscene sado-masochistic abuse 
with the intent to distribute the , 
same." 
and replace them with the words: 
"is obscene". 
Such is not permissible construction. A court may not delete 
words from the middle of a statute or add words to it. 
62 cases of Jam et. al. v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 
(1951). See also 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §203 (courts cannot 
add words to a statute). 
Severance allows the court to strike part of a 
statute only if the remaining part can stand on its own. 
16 Am.Jur.2d Const. Law, §183. This cannot be done with Salt 
Lake's ordinance. If §32-2-10 (3) is struck, no charging 
statute remains. If the objectionable part of it is struck, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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only part of a sentence remains. 
The trial court blithely stated that it construed 
the ordinance but it did not put down in 1-ack and white what 
remained after striking part and did not look at it to deter-
mine whether that which remained made sense. Had it done 
so it would have realized the ordinance was butchered beyond 
repair. 
Salt Lake contends that the trial court gave 
proper instructions and thus this conviction should stand. 
However, whether proper instructions were given or not does 
not bar a defendant such as PIEPENBURG, who admittedly may 
be the subject of a properly drawn statute, from raising as 
a complete defense, the fact that the statute on its face 
may sweep within its ambit other protected activity. The 
First Amendment is so precious and the principle of eradi-
cating all statutes which on their faces proscribe protected 
activity so important, that it has come to be a doctrine of 
First Amendment law that even though the defendant's activity 
is not protected, he may raise overbreadth as a defense. 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-521 (1972). NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963). 
The reason for this is obvious. For example, if 
the ordinance barred showing a film of a girl in a bathing 
suit, can a theater be prosecuted under it so long as the 
-5-
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court instructs in the language of Miller? Of course not. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING THE ORDINANCE CAN BE "AUTHORI-
TATIVELY CONSTRUED" TO PASS CONSTITUTIONAL 
MUSTER, THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE PREVENTS 
PROSECUTING FOR ACTIVITY TRANSPIRING 
BEFORE SUCH AUTHORITATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
No one questions the right of an authoritative 
construction to have retroactive civil effects but the due 
process clause prevents criminal prosecution for activity 
transpiring before the authoritative construction. This is 
so because before a man may be penalized criminally, he must 
be able to ascertain in advance precisely what the law is 
that governs his activity. In Pierce v. United States, 
314 U.S. 306 (1941) the court held: 
M
. . . a . . . judicial enlargement 
of a criminal Act by interpretation 
is at war with a fundamental concept 
of the common law that crimes must be 
defined with appropriate definiteness." 
(314 U.S. at 311) 
In Crow v. State, 180 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.Crim.App. 1943) the 
court held: 
". . . when by judicial decision a 
construction of a statute is changed 
from that formerly given said statute 
the change by the latter decision 
should be given prospective effect 
only." (180 S.W.2d at 356) 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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See also United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 288 (1891) 
(holding that before punishment can be imposed, one must be 
able to precisely determine what the law is that governs 
his activity.) 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR 
FAILURE TO PROVIDE PROPER APPELLATE 
REVIEW 
Salt Lake ignores the well settled law that in 
First Amendment cases not only the statute but the entire 
record must be reviewed by the appellate court. The following 
quote by the California Supreme Court from Zeitlin v. Arne-
bergh, 31 Cal.Rptr. 800, 383 P.2d 152 (Sup.Ct.Cal. 1963) 
clearly states appellant's position: 
". . . the reviewing court must make 
an 'independent examination1 of the 
whole record in cases involving the 
constitutional issue of free speech 
(Edwards v. South Carolina (1963) , 
372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 
697; Niemotko v. Maryland (1951), 
340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325, 95 L.Ed. 
267; Feiner v. People of State of 
New York (1951), 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 
303, 95 L.Ed. 267; Pennekamp v. Florida' 
(1946), 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 
90 L.Ed. 1295; Fiske v. Kansas (1927), 
274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655, 71 L.Ed. 
1108; Attorney General v. Book Named 
"Tropic of Cancer" (1962), 344 Mass. 
, 184 N.E.2d 328; People v. Rich-
mond County News (1961), 9 N.Y.2d 578, 
580-581, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 175 N.E.2d 
681 [opinion of Fuld, J.] . . . ." 
(383 P.2d at 157) 
-7-
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Thus since this matter involves expression, this court must 
review all issues or find the ordinance unconstitutional for 
failure to provide proper appellate review on all issues. 
See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 247 F.Supp. 
906, 911 (N.D. Tex. 1965). 
POINT V 
THE JURY WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
TAINTED 
Salt Lake cites law to the effect that PIEPENBURG 
must prove prejudice from the tainted jury. Such cases do 
not apply here because the fact situation before this court is 
so completely different from those in the cases cited by 
Salt Lake. In the typical case, the alleged tainted jury 
has read newspaper articles about the case or has made an 
unauthorized phone call or a juror inadvertently does some-
thing questionable. Such fact situations give rise to the . 
cases cited by Salt Lake. 
This case is a horse of a different color. It 
came to trial in the midst of an anti-obscenity campaign by 
the church, with statements from its president that each 
should "do all in their power" to fight obscenity, that members 
should "become actively and relentlessly engaged in the fight 
against pornography." See Exhibit "2 D". 
Against this backdrop, then Deputy Attorney General 
- s - •• . ; ; • 
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Hansen investigated jurors by going to their bishops and 
church leaders for information about them (T-18). This becomes 
known to the jurors and so they are aware that their church, 
their spiritual and moral leaders, are cooperating with and 
are on the side of the prosecutor. 
At this point, the court suggests that statements 
to the media by the prosecutor might pose a problem (T-19). 
In apparent compliance with this suggestion, the prosecutors 
advise the court that they will ask the media not to print 
previous statements they made to them (T-19). Then, with the 
nerve of a riverboat gambler, at the very next recess, after 
giving his word to the court, Hansen states to the media 
that he checked whether jurors were "pro or anti-pornography"; 
that he checked jurors through their bishops, that five 
jurors favored conviction and two would probably hold out 
for a hung jury. (T-142, et. seq., Exhibit "13 D") . Five 
jurors saw this interview on television. 
Apart from the effect of Hansen's television 
interview in the midst of the trial, jurors learned what 
was being done about them from other sources. One juror was 
told by a church official he was being checked out (T-162). 
Another was aware a check was made as to whether she was a 
good girl or "partied a lot" (T-161). 
Thus these subtle pressures conspired together 
inexorably to compel the jurors to prove, by their verdict, 
that they were good church members, that they were not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"party girls", that they were not pro-pornography, A threat 
of violence to the jurors could not have been more effective. 
They felt themselves on trial. Their good names were at 
stake. 
In response to all this, Salt Lake argues that 
the trial judge's decision on this be followed. He was 
there, he should know. (Respondent's Brief, Pg. 42). The 
judge was there all right and at various times he stated, 
"the court didn't satisfy itself", that the jurors were 
unaffected (T-167). He was "extremely concerned" about the 
Attorney General's activity, and that he did not know "what 
the effect of the stories may have been" (T-158,165). He 
found that there was "subtle persuasion"; that the jurors 
know that they are "being watched" (T-252). The following 
colloquy graphically demonstrates the trial judge's opinion 
after hearing testimony regarding the tactics of the Deputy 
Attorney General: 
The prosecutor: 
". . . There's no showing . . . 
that the jury is tainted to the 
point where they can't render a 
fair and impartial judgment . . . " 
The court: 
"The problem the court has in 
connection with it, it isn't 
'tained to a point', its tainted" 
(T-251). (Emphasis supplied) 
Later the trial judge apparently forgot that 
earlier he had unequivocally found the jury tainted. While 
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the ruling of the trial judge on the Motion for Mistrial is 
on Salt Lake's sidef his findings are mint for reversal. 
Appellant's counsel respectfully suggests that perhaps the 
trial judge's personal feelings were at war with his legal 
instincts. He sentenced PIEPENBURG, a father of infant 
children, to jail to the maximum jail term in a case where 
the crime is only a misdemeanor, where it was the defendant's 
first offense and by the trial court's own finding, the jury 
was tainted and where his alleged crime consisted of showing 
a film that a responsible court had held to be not obscene 
as a matter of law. Somewhat unusual in the state where most 
first offenders in nonviolent felony cases get probation when 
convicted by juries who no one claims are tainted, where no 
court had previously ruled that the alleged misconduct was 
noncriminal as a matter of law. 
To all this, Salt Lake replies that the jurors 
said they would be unaffected by being investigated and 
"watched". Courts should be chary to accept a juror's own 
protestations of his ability to be fair but should decide the 
issue for themselves from all the facts. Doctors do not 
treat themselves. Lawyers should not represent themselves 
and by definition, one who is partial is not impartial to 
judge his own lack of partiality. Who can judge the effect 
of such subtle moral forces? What good woman would not agonize 
over and pay any price to avoid being known as a "party 
girl?" How many women would choose the scarlet letter? Can 
-11-
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all the jurors do it? Such is the stuff men have given their 
lives for. Yet Salt Lake tells us that these considerations 
are trivial. 
POINT VI 
THE NORTH CAROLINA DECISION FINDING 
MEMORIES NOT OBSCENE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW REMOVES THE NECESSARY ELEMENT OF 
INTENT FROM THE CRIME 
Salt Lake asks this court to disregard State ex 
rel. Yeager v. Neal, 26 N.C.App. 741, 217 S.E.2d 576 (1975) 
because community standards vary from state to state. 
(Respondent's Brief, Pg. 49). Of course, community standards 
vary from state to state and had Neal been decided on the 
issue of community standards, PIEPENBURG would have no argu-
ment. The film, however, was held not obscene as a matter of 
law because it did not lack serious artistic value. (See 
Appendix A to Appellant's Supplemental Brief). This was 
affirmed on appeal. The artistic value test is totally 
independent of community standards, is not modified by 
community standards and does not vary from community to 
community. Miller v. Calif., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
Salt Lake also claims that if one court's finding 
of nonobscenity can be used favorably by a defendant in 
another court, then a finding of obscenity in one court 
against one defendant could be used against another defendant 
• -12-
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in another court without benefit of trial. Without getting 
into the myriad complexities of this tortured analogy suffice 
it to say that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right 
to Confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and that the Bill 
of Rights does not extend to prosecutorial bodies. Intro-
duction of a finding of obscenity in a case where the defend-
ant did not appear denies him this constitutional right. 
POINT VII 
THE SURVEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED 
Salt Lake contends that before a survey can be 
probative, all interviewees must be shown the film in question. 
(Appellee's Brief, Pgs. 32 and 33). This ignores the fact 
that Salt Lake contends that showing the film is a crime. 
If Salt Lake is right, a defendant must commit a crime to 
present a defense in court; in fact, to do a good survey, 
he must commit the crime 500 times. Under Salt Lake's theory, 
in order to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to adduce 
evidence in his behalf, he must risk additional prosecution. 
It is well established that no price must be paid for exercising 
one's constitutional right. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 
593, 597 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 
394 (1968). 
In Miller v. Calif., 413 U.S. 15, 31 (Footnote 12) 
(1973), the Supreme Court upheld the use of surveys in 
obscenity cases. In that case, the foundation for the poll 
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was much weaker than here. In this case, an experienced 
survey analyst using scientfically accepted methods of surve; 
analysis, was employed. In Miller, a police officer merely 
went out and asked questions. Certainly the defendant's 
survey here comports more with reliability than that which 
the Supreme Court sanctioned. 
Surveys are generally admitted if they are 
relevant on any issue in the case. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 
Holiday Out In America, 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 
F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But obscenity is the one and 
only area of the law where surveys are a must because 
community standards is the test. The jurors are forbidden tc 
use their own standards. Stiith v. Calif., 361 U.S. 147, 165-
166 (1959) (Frankfurter concurring). In re Gianinni, 72 
Cal. Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535, 544 (1968). How else do you 
prove community standards? With a photograph? An eye witnes 
A document? That is why the Supreme Court in Miller was so 
lenient in letting in such a palpably weak survey—there is r 
other way. 
Surveys asking the same questions as the defense 
survey are admitted in obscenity cases. See Pines. The 
Obscentiy Quagmire, California State Bar Journal, 509, 561 
(Nov./Dec. 1974) 
Salt Lake contends that if the survey were probati 
-14-
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unanimous verdicts such as against PIEPENBURG would be unlikely. 
(Appellee's Brief, Pg. 32). This, the City contends, bespeaks 
the inherent lack of reliability and probative value of the 
survey. This reasoning tortures truth. The public record 
discloses that before this case came to trial, PIEPENBRUG was 
acquitted in Salt Lake City Case No. 37450; acquitted in 
Salt Lake City Case No. 38086; that in Salt Lake City, Case 
No. 43919, the City dismissed its case and that there was 
also a hung jury in Case No. 37450. The case before this Court 
is the only conviction ever sustained against him. Thus, 
contrary to Salt Lake's claim, the results tend to support 
the survey. 
Salt Lake claims that the poll is too remote in 
time and, therefore, not probative. It claims it is remote 
by one and one-half years. (Respondent's Brief, Pg. 31). 
Salt Lake is wrong; it was not one and one-half years, it was 
approximately nine and one-half months. The alleged criminal 
activity was October 24, 1975. The poll was taken February 1, 
1975. Did the sex mores of Salt Lake undergo a radical change 
in nine and one-half months? 
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APPENDIX A 
ORSCENITY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
167.060 Definitions for ORS 167.060 to 167.095. 
As used in ORS 167.060 to 167.095, unless the context 
requires otherwise: 
(1) "Advertising purposes" means purposes of 
propagandizing in connection with the commercial sale of 
a product or type of product, the commercial offering of a 
service, or the commercial exhibition of an entertainment. 
(2) "Displays publicly" means the exposing, 
placing, posting, exhibiting, or in any fashion displaying 
in any location, whether public or private, an item in such a 
manner that it may be readily seen and its content or character 
distinguished by normal unaided vision viewing it from a public 
thoroughfare, depot or vehicle. 
(3) "Furnishes" means to sell, give, rent, loan 
or otherwise provide. 
(4) "Minor" means an unmarried person under 18 
years of age. 
(5) "Nudity" means uncovered, or less than 
opaquely covered, post-pubertal human genitals, pubic areas, 
the post-pubertal human female breat below a point immediately 
above the top of the areola, or the covered human male genitals 
app. i. 
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in a discernibly turgid state. For purposes of this definition, 
a female breast is considered uncovered if the nipple only or 
the nipple and aerola only are covered. 
(6) "Obscene performance" means a play, motion 
picture, dance, show or other presentation, whether pictured, 
animated or live, performed before an audience and which in 
whole or in part depicts or reveals nudity, sexual conduct, 
sexual excitement or sadomasochistic abuse, or which includes 
obscenities or explicit verbal discriptions or narrative 
accounts of sexual conduct. 
(7) "Obscenities" means those slang words currently 
generally rejected for regular use in mixed society, that are 
used to refer to genitals, female breasts, sexual conduct or 
excretory functions or products, either that have no other 
meaning or that in context are clearly used for their bodily, 
sexual or excretory meaning. 
(8) "Public thoroughfare, depot or vehicle" means 
any street, highway, park, depot or transportation platform, 
or other place, whether indoors or out, or any vehicle for 
public transportation, owned or operated by government, either 
directly or through a public corporation or authority, or 
owned or operated by any agency of public transportation that 
is designed for the use, enjoyment or transportation of the 
general public. 
(9) "Sadomasochistic abuse" means flagellation or 
app. ii. 
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torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in under-
garments or in revealing or bizarre costume, or the condition 
of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on 
the part of one so clothed. 
(10) "Sexual conduct" means human masturbation, 
sexual intercourse, or any touching of the genitals, pubic 
areas or buttocks of the human male or female, or the breasts 
of the female, whether alone or between members of the same or 
opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of 
apparent sexual stimulation or gratification. 
(11) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of 
human male or female genitals or the breats of the female 
when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual experi-
ences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or 
nudity. 
[1971 c.743 s.255] 
. 167.065 Furnishing obscene materials to minors. 
(1) A person commits the crime of furnishing obscene materials 
to minors if, knowing or having good reason to know the 
character of the material furnished, he furnishes to a minor: 
(a) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, 
motion picture, film or other visual representation or image 
of a person or portion of the human body that depicts nudity, 
sadomasochistic abuse, sexual conduct or sexual excitement; or 
app. iii. 
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(b) Any book, magazine, paperback, pamphlet or 
other written or printed matter, however reproduced, or any 
sound recording which contains matter of the nature described 
in paragraph (a) of this subsection, or obscenities, or explicit 
verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual conduct, 
sexual excitement or sadomasochistic abuse. 
(2) Furnishing obscene materials to minors is 
a Class A misdemeanor. Notwithstanding ORS 161.635 and 161.655, 
a person convicted under this section may be sentenced to pay 
a fine, fixed by the court, not exceeding $10,000. 
[1971 c.743 s.256] 
167.075 Exhibitin an obscene performance to a 
minor. (1) A person commits the crime of exhibiting an 
obscene performance to a minor if the minor is unaccompanied 
by his parent or lawful guardian, and for a monetary consider-
ation or other valuable commodity or service, the person 
knowingly or recklessly: 
(a) Exhibits an obscene performance to the minor; 
or 
(b) Sells an admission ticket or other means to 
gain entrance to an obscene performance to the minor; or 
(c) Permits the admission of the minor to 
premises whereon there is exhibited an obscene performance. 
(2) No employee is liable to prosecution under 
this seciton or under any city or home-rule county ordinance 
app. iv. 
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for exhibiting or possessing with intent to exhibit any 
obscene motion picture provided the employee is acting 
within the scope of his regular employment at a showing 
open to the public. 
(3) As used in this section, "employee" means any 
person regularly employed by the owner or operator of a 
motion picture theater if he has no financial interest other 
than salary or wages in the ownership or operation of the 
motion picture theater, no financial interest in or control 
over the selection of the motion pictures shown in the theater, 
and is working within the motion picture theater where he is 
regularly employed, but does not include a manager of the 
motion picture theater. 
(4) Exhibiting an obscene performance to a minor 
is a Class A misdemeanor. Notwithstanding ORS 161.635 and 
161.655, a person convicted under this section may be sen-
tenced to pay a fine, fixed by the court, not exceeding 
$10,000. 
[1971 c.743 s.258] 
167.080 Displaying obscene materials to minors. 
(1) A person commits the crime of displaying obscene materials 
to minors if, being the owner, operator or manager of a busi-
ness or acting in a managerial capacity, he knowingly or 
recklessly permits a minor who is not accompanied by his 
parent or lawful guardian to enter or remain on the premises, 
if in that part of the premises where the minor is so permitted 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
K, 
to be, there is visibly displayed: 
(a) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, 
or other visual representation or image of a person or portion 
of the human body that depicts nudity, sexual conduct, sexual 
excitement or sadomasochistic abuse; or 
(b) Any book, magazine, paperback, pamphlet 
or other written or printed matter, however reproduced, that 
reveals a person or portion of the human body that depicts 
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement or sadomasochistic 
abuse. / . 
(2) Displaying obscene materials to minors is 
a Class A misdemeanor. Notwithstanding ORS 161.635 and 
161.655, a person convicted under this section may be sen-
tenced to pay a fine, fixed by the court, not exceeding $10,000. 
[1971 c.743 s.259] 
167.087 Disseminating obscene material. (1) A 
person commits the crime of disseminating obscene material 
if he knowingly makes, exhibits, sells, delivers or provides, 
or offers or agrees to make, exhibit, sell, deliver or provide, 
or has in his possession with intent to exhibit, sell, 
deliver or provide any obscene writing, picture, motion 
picture, films, slides, drawings or other visual reproduction. 
(2) As used in subsection (1) of this section, 
matter is obscene if: 
(a) It depicts or describes in a patently offen-
sive manner sadomasochistic abuse or sexual conduct; 
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(b) The average person applying contemporary 
state standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals 
to the prurient interest in sex; and 
(c) Taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political or scientific value. 
(3) In any prosecution for a violation of this 
section, it shall be relevant on the issue of knowledge to 
prove the advertising, publicity, promotion, method of 
handling or labeling of the matter, including any statement 
on the cover or back of any book or magazine, 
(4) No employee is liable to prosecution under 
this section or under any city or home-rule county ordinance 
for exhibiting or possessing with intent to exhibit any 
obscene motion picture provided the employee is acting within 
the scope of his regular employment at a showing open to the 
public. 
(5) As used in this section, "employee" means 
an employee as defined in subsection (3) of ORS 167.075. 
(6) Disseminating obscene material is a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
[1973 c.699 s.4] 
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